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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Informed Consent and Human Experimentation
The traditional function of consent has been to differentiate those
medical interventions which were legally permissible from those which
would subject a physician to liability for an unauthorized experiment on
his patient. Recently courts have concluded that a patient's assent to
a medical procedure is valid, i.e. voluntary, only if it is based on adequate
information about the intervention, including its attendant risks.' A phy-
sician may now be held liable either for negligence in a malpractice suit,
if he fails to inform a patient, or battery, if his failure to inform is found
to have vitiated the patient's consent. In order to comprehend this very
important concept of informed consent, one must examine, first, some
of the constructions which courts have given to informed consent; then
one must explore some of the functions which informed consent could
serve for the human experimentation process; and finally, one must cer-
tainly study the inadequacies of informed consent. 2
The concept of informed consent was most strongly set forth in the
code adopted by the United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg as
a standard by which twenty-five German scientists accused of medical
atrocities were to be judged. This code is one of the most highly publi-
cized and carefully developed set of precepts specifically written to meet
the problem of human experimentation. The code is particularly relevant
in the United States since it operated according to American procedural
rules and its principles on human experimentation are consistent with the
ethics governing American medical practice. 3 Although this code does not
have the authority of an American statute, decisions of the United States
Military Tribunal based upon it should be considered the main articula-
tion of American standards governing human experimentation. The tri-
bunal stated that the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential:
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity
to consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power
of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud,
deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint
or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and compre-
hension of the elements of the subject matter involved so as to enable
him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter
element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative de-
l J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 523 (1972).
2 Id.
3 Mulford, Human Experimentation, 20 STAN. L. REV. 99, 103 (1967).
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cision by the experimental subject there should be made known to
him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method
and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and
hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health
or person which may possibly come from his participation in the
experiment.
4
Each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment
is responsible for ascertaining the quality of the consent; this respon-
sibility may not be delegated to another. The tribunal further stipulated
that the human subject be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end
should he reach the physical or mental state where continuation of the
experiment seemed to him to be impossible. 5
Using the Nuremberg military tribunal code as an example, the House
of Delegates of the American Medical Association adopted the report
of their Judicial Council on requirements for human experimentation,
formulating three main principles; 1) The voluntary consent of the person
on whom the experiment is to be performed must be obtained (informed
consent); 2) The danger of each experiment must have been investigated
previously by means of animal experimentation; and 3) The experiment
must be performed under proper medical protection.
6
The only federal or state statute dealing with research on human beings
requires informed consent. Section 505(i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (1964), which applies only to experimental drugs, stipulates
that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall promulgate
regulations concerning drugs intended solely for investigational use. This
statute requires a sponsor of research to obtain certification from inves-
tigators that the investigators will obtain the informed consent of all human
beings to whom they will administer experimental drugs. This statute
appears to give investigators a disturbing amount of freedom in that these
investigators may refrain from obtaining the informed consent of their
subjects where they deem it not feasible or, in their best professional judg-
ment, contrary to the best interests of such human beings. 7 To compen-
sate for this apparent weakness in the statute, the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs, as the Secretary's delegate, promulgated strict regulations
in 1966, distinguishing between therapeutic and non-therapeutic exper-
imentation. Informed consent must be obtained in all cases in which ex-
perimentation with drugs is performed mainly for the accumulation of
knowledge, i.e. non-therapeutic administering of drugs. In cases in which
patients are under treatment with investigational drugs, i.e. therapeutic
4 Id. at 103.
5 M. PAPPWORTH, HUMAN GUINEA PIGS 188 (1967).
6 Id. at 189.
1 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. #301-392 (1964, Supp. 11, 1965-1966).
See Food and Drug Reg. #130-137, 32 Fed. Reg. 8753 (rev. June 20, 1967). For legal discussion
see Morse, Legal Implications of Clinical Investigations, 20 VAND. L. REV. 747 (1967).
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experimentation, informed consent is required in all but exceptional cases.
Informed consent is "not feasible" only, when the patient's inability
to communicate renders consent impossible. An example of such a sit-
uation occurs when the patient is unconscious and when it is necessary
to administer the drug before the patient's representative can be reached.
Informed consent is "contrary to the best interests" of the subject when
the communication of information would seriously affect the patient's
disease status. These regulations also require the investigator to obtain
the patient's consent in writing and to inform the subject fully and clearly
of all the facts prior to obtaining the consent, including information about
alternative forms of treatment.8
Experiments conducted within the scope of the doctor-patient relation-
ship must certainly include the important factor of informed consent. The
physician treating his patient is guided by the professional maxim, primum
non nocere ("first of all, do no harm"), which dates back to the Hippocratic
Oath. Since the doctor's dedication to this principle may be sufficient to pro-
tect the interests of the patient in cases of therapeutic experimentation, in-
formed consent, while desirable, is not considered necessarily vital. The
law does impose civil liability for battery on any doctor who performs
a therapeutic operation without the express or implied consent of the
patient, even if the operation benefits the patient. The Declaration of
Helsinki, published by the World Medical Association, and officially
endorsed by the American Medical Association (1964), states that in in-
stances in which clinical research is combined with professional care,
informed consent may be dispensed with, where full disclosure is not
consistent with patient psychology.9
However, in non-therapeutic experiments in which the doctor may be
more concerned with advancing the state of medical knowledge than with
his patient's recovery, informed consent is essential to protect the sub-
ject's welfare. The Declaration of Helsinki requires informed consent in
all cases in which the experiments are intended for non-therapeutic
purposes. 10
The Declaration of Helsinki is one of several codifications by in-
ternational and national professional medical bodies. These formu-
lations essentially embody the well-known criteria of the Nuremberg
Code. In addition, and of special legal significance, there are several im-
portant regulations, directives, and policy memoranda discussing pro-
cedures within research institutions themselves.
In the United States, the most important of these quasi-legal mandates
originate within the federal government and its health agencies. In July,
8 Mulford, supra note 3, at 104.
9 Id. at 104, 105.
10 Id. at 105.
3
Emma: Informed Consent and Human Experimentation
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1974
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
1966, the Surgeon General issued a policy and procedure statement to
all grantee institutions, in which requirements to insure the rights of persons
involved in clinical research were set forth. This directive stipulated that
no grants in support of research were to be continued or awarded unless
arrangements were made for consideration of proposals for research
involving human subjects by institutional associates of an interdisci-
plinary committee. These institutional committees are responsible for
determining
1) That the rights and welfare of those involved are protected,
2) That appropriate methods are used to obtain informed consent,
and
3) That the risks of the procedure are proportionate to the potential
medical benefits. 
The Office of the Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
issued a statement in 1966, outlining the group consideration and in-
formed consent practices which would be used by each Institute. An
ascending system of review committees, beginning in each Institute, rising
to a clinical research committee of the Medical Board, and culminating in
the Medical Board itself, was arranged to transmit all research projects
involving the participation of normal volunteers; non-diagnostic, non-
therapeutic studies involving patients which might be referred for approval;
and therapeutic or diagnostic studies with unusual hazards which might
be referred for approval.1 2 Expectations of voluntary and informed con-
sent of patients and volunteers were set forth, along with procedures for
making records of this information. The statement emphasized these prin-
ciples as central to clinical research
1) Group consideration,
2) Informed consent of the patient or volunteer, and
3) The freedom of the subjects to withdraw from a project at any
time. 13
Since many research institutions model their practices after NIH, the
effects of the statement, added to the significant changes brought about
by the policy statements of the Surgeon General, extend far beyond their
source.
Another governmental regulation which requires informed consent to
non-therapeutic experiments is Air Force Regulation No. 169-8 (Use of
Volunteers in Aerospace Research), which states: "The voluntary in-
formed consent of the human subject is essential.' 1 4 The subject must
have the legal capacity to consent and must be able to withdraw his consent
1 Fletcher, Human Experimentation, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 620, 621 (1967).
12 Id. at 622.
13 Id. at 622.
14 Mulford, supra note 3, at 104.
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at any time during the research project. Research centers of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) seem to follow similar
procedures. Furthermore, NASA employees must witness both the briefing
of the subject and the signing of the consent form. 15
The legal situation in regard to judicial decisions related to human
experimentation is sketchy at present. Governmental regulations,
such as the ones described above, appear to provide the most significant
sources of standards governing consent. A few important decisions by
American public bodies have come forth in the past two decades. However,
these decisions have mainly dealt with specific cases and did not consider
research in terms of right and liability of a trained professional to use a
living patient or a normal subject as a means of research not necessarily
of direct benefit to that patient or subject.
A significant decision of this type was the 1966 censure by the Re-
gents of the University of the State of New York of Drs. Southam and
Mandel, who had not obtained adequate informed consent for the in-
jection of cancer cells into twenty-two patients at the Jewish Hospital for
Chronic Illness. The object of the procedure was not in question, but the
method of obtaining consent was. Even though the cells were felt to be
harmless to the patients, it was judged that because the investigators had
not specifically stated what kind of cells were being injected, material
information necessary to make an informed decision had been withheld. The
Regents suspended the licenses of the doctors for one year, but the sus-
pensions were stayed, and the doctors were placed on probation for one
year.6 This decision is of legal significance because it was made by a
legislatively appointed body and could possibly be persuasive to a court
deciding a case involving similar circumstances. It is important to note
also that this widely publicized decision had the effect of sharpening the
public awareness of medical research on humans and the central importance
of informed consent.
Informed consent remains a relatively ill-defined concept, despite
some of the interesting constructions briefly discussed above. Another
aspect which deserves examination is the functional relevance of informed
consent for human experimentation. Most clearly, requiring informed con-
sent serves society's desire to respect each individual's autonomy and
his right to make choices concerning his own life. This function of informed
consent involves safeguarding the concept of freedom, protecting the
status of the subject as a human being, and avoiding fraud and duress over
the subject. A landmark case in this functional aspect of informed consent
is Id.
16 Fletcher, supra note II, at 622-624. The board imposed sanctions, under the authority
given it by New York Education Law #6514(2) to revoke, suspend, or annul the license of a
practitioner of medicine upon determining "After due hearing . . . that a physician ... is
guilty of fraud, or deceit ... or has been guilty of unprofessional conduct."
5
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occurred in 1957, in Masden v. Harrison,1 7 and concerned the consent of a
minor to donate a kidney for his identical twin brother, who suffered from a
chronic renal disease that would soon prove fatal. The judge found the
operation was necessary for the continued good health and future well-
being of the healthy twin, who would doubtlessly have been emotionally
disturbed for the rest of his life if this sick twin should have died without
the transplant. This decision reaffirmed the principle that the individual
is physically inviolable; his interests are paramount; and consent for any
action that may violate the integrity of the physical being must be based
upon the assumption that such action will be for his benefit.18
Another interesting case involved in the concept of informed consent
deserves brief reiteration here. In Natanson v. Kline,"9 the plaintiff, Irma
Natanson, suffering from a cancer of the breast had a radical left mastec-
tomy performed on May 29, 1955. The plaintiff engaged Dr. John R. Kline,
a radiologist, for radiation therapy to the site of the mastectomy and the
surrounding areas. The plaintiff, as a result of injuries sustained from this
radiation therapy, alleged that she had been given an excessive amount
of radiation. She brought an action for malpractice against the hospital
and the physician in charge of its radiology department. In essence, the
patient consented to the treatment, but alleged that the nature and con-
sequences of the risks of the treatment were not explained to her. This
case was tried before a jury which returned a verdict in favor of both de-
fendants. This case, however, sparked a series of investigations into the
legality of informed consent, and examinations of what constituted in-
formed consent. 20
The United States Public Health Service also issued a directive giving
guidelines for clinical investigations using human beings as subjects. No
subject may participate in an investigative type of procedure unless he is
mentally competent and has sufficient mental and communicative capacity
to understand his choice to participate. The volunteer must be twenty-one
years of age or more. If he is less than twenty-one, he may participate in
a procedure intended to protect or improve his personal health or other-
wise for his personal benefit if the informed written consent of his parents
or legal guardian be obtained as well as the written consent of the subject. 21
A significant function of informed consent is the encouragement of
rational decisionmaking. First of all, the subject must be given a fair and
11 No. 68657 Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. CT., June 12, 1957. See: Huslay v. Harrison, No. 68666
Eq., Mass. Sup. Jud. CT., Aug. 30, 1957. Foster V. Harrison, No. 68674 Eq., Mass. Sup.
Jud. CT., Nov. 20, 1957. In these two cases, similar opinions were rendered after hearings
by Justices Whittemore and Cutter respectively. See also Curran, A Problem of Consent:
Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 891 (1959). See also Restatement,
Torts § 59, comment a (1939).
18 KATZ, supra note 1, at 529-539.
10 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
20 Fletcher, supra note I1, at 630, 631.
21 KATZ, supra note I1, at 540-550.
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reasonable explanation of the proposed treatment, including the probable
effect and any special or unusual risks. In Halushka v. University of Sas-
katchewan,2 2 the appellants, Drs. Wyant and Merriman were found to have
committed a trespass against the plaintiff since they did not obtain his
consent to the type of test that they performed. These doctors were also
found negligent in the performance of the test since they did not fully ex-
plain it to the plaintiff, and did not acquire his complete medical history
before the test was made. The plaintiff was given a previously untested
anesthetic and was not "informed" as to its potential dangers. 23 The
findings of the court certainly reinforced the notion that true informed
consent must be obtained in clinical experimentation on human beings.
This informed consent means that the subject has been given a thorough
explanation of the procedure and all inherent dangers. Ideally, a patient
will be informed of all possible collateral risks of contemplated therapy
and his consent to confronting them will then insulate his physician from
liability if any described risk materializes.
A function of informed consent which is of great significance to the
investigators is its protection of the experimental process. This protection
involves several aspects which bear brief discussion. In conceptualizing
the relationship between patient and physician or between subject and
investigator, the term partnership rather than contract, might more ac-
curately describe their joint adventure in a common cause. This type of
conceptualization would increase investigator-subject communication
by a mutual feeling of fidelity between two individuals.
24
The experimental process, when performed under the proper exigencies
of informed consent, does not become subject to unfavorable public reac-
tions. There is no doubt, for example, as to the community reaction to the
administration, even in the name of research, of live cancer cells to un-
witting patients. Unless the advances of science are used with discrimina-
tion, the constructive and productive use of these advances may be dras-
tically and unnecessarily restricted by a fearful community. 25
At the other end of the "consent" spectrum lies the problem of
physicians who attempt to comply with the principle of informed consent,
even where compliance is not in conformance with good medical practice.
This required informed consent may create delay, apprehension, and re-
strictions on the use of new techniques that will impair the progress of
medicine. The same law which protects the interests of the patient or
the subject, should also encourage self-reliant surgeons to whom patients
may safely entrust their bodies, and not intimidate those who may be
tempted to shirk from duty for fear of a law suit. Civil and criminal liability
22 52 W.W.R. 608 (Sask. 1965).
23 KATZ, supra note 1, at 569-573.
24 Id. at 589, 590.
21 Id. at 591-594.
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must be removed in some cases in which implied consent is justifiable and
preferable to informed consent.26 The delicate balance between the rights
of both physician and patient, or researcher and subject must somehow
be maintained.
The concept of consent has been much derided as unrealistic and ar-
tificial, and of course it encompasses a range of responses that differ in
their degree of autonomy and understanding. The psychological con-
straints and compulsions that operate on a seriously ill patient differ from
those that affect a person attracted to an experiment through an advertise-
ment. Nevertheless, a requirement of "voluntary, informed consent"
does have values beyond that of the symbolic respect for individual au-
tonomy and personality. One such very important function of consent is
its reflexive effect on the management of the experiment itself. To an-
alyze an experiment in terms of risks and benefits to particular groups by
way of presentation for consent is an excellent procedure for self-scrutiny
by the investigator.27
The above discussion of the functions of voluntary, informed consent
leads quite naturally to the primary problems involved: the limitations and
inadequacies of informed consent. In order to give effective protection
to the subjects' rights and the integrity of the human experimentation
process, the concept of informed consent must take into account the
existent limitations on the subjects' ability to make intelligent and insight-
ful decisions. One must consider the impediments to self-determination
and informed consent inherent in the psychological forces, intellectual
capacities, and social pressures operating in and on man. Is it possible
that an awareness of these problems on the part of investigators and sub-
jects can overcome the failures of understanding, communication, and in-
telligent decisionmaking which now disturb the research process? The
definitions of the limitations inherent in informed consent go far beyond
the human experimentation process and often reflect contradictory as-
sumptions about the nature and rights of man.2 8
A closer look at a few specific inadequacies of informed consent will
help to demonstrate some of its inherent problems. While informed consent
is an important prerequisite to conducting experiments on human beings, it
may often be insufficient to protect the subject. The complexities of modern
research often make informed consent virtually impossible to achieve.
The subject is ordinarily not very qualified to evaluate the true risks and
expected benefits of any given experimental procedures. An investigator
might minimize, either consciously or unconsciously experimental risks
and uncertainties. The investigator, in fact, may not be aware of all the
risks. Consent is an equally troublesome factor since many experiments
26 Rosenberg, Informed Consent-The Latest Threat, 189 J. LEGAL MEDICINE 17-19 (1973).
27 KATZ, supra note 1, at 603-606.
28 Id. at 609-611.
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are performed on medical students and on prisoners. The desire to please
a professor or a parole board might preclude these individuals from giving
truly voluntary consent. Likewise, the special relationship of trust be-
tween a patient and his physician may induce many patients to consent
to any medical practices their doctors propose.29
Requiring the informed consent of every experimental subject raises
problems for investigators. Disclosure of enough facts to enable the subject
to make an informed decision may, in some cases, hinder legitimate scien-
tific inquiry. Investigators face an additional problem when they must
use minors as subjects. In general, the consent of the legally incompetent
is no defense to civil tort liability. Some courts have made an exception
so that the consent of a mature minor capable of understanding the con-
sequences of his act will protect a physician from liability not based on
negligence; but this exception has been held to be inapplicable where the
operation is non-therapeutic. The researcher should be required to obtain
the consent of the minor's guardian, which would usually be sufficient
to protect the minor's interests. Whenever the minor is old enough to
be capable of intelligent consideration of the issues involved, his consent
should be obtained as an additional precaution. 3
The inherent limitations in and impediments to informed consent raise
certain significant questions to which there are no ready, apparent
answers. How and to what extent whould the dynamics of the inner and
outer world, inherent in the nature of man, be considered in defining his ca-
pacity for self-determination and informed consent? How are these dynam-
ics affected by the nature and extent of the information given to the subject?
To what extent can and should the investigator ascertain from the subject
that informed consent has been obtained? The answers to these questions
most certainly have implications for the formulation, administration, and
review of the human experimentation process. 31
LAWRENCE EMMA
Deed Absolute in Lieu of Foreclosure-
A Cost and Delay Internalizer
A deed absolute in lieu of foreclosure1 may be defined as a "mortgagor/
debtor's" reconveyance of his equity of redemption in the defaulted prop-
erty to the "mortgagee/creditor" in consideration for the creditor's prom-
29 Mulford, supra note 3, at 106.
30 Id. at 107, 108.
31 KATZ, supra note 1, at 610.
1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 775 (4th ed. 1951). Foreclosure is a termination of all
rights of the mortgagor or his grantee in the property covered by the mortgage, thus the def-
inition covers court foreclosure, strict foreclosure and the power of sale.
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